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BC OVERALL CRIME DOWN 
BUT HOMICIDES UP
B.C.’s Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor 
General Policing and Security Branch released its 
provincial crime statistics for 2017. Highlights of 
this report include:
-4.1%
HOMICIDE	BY	THE	NUMBERS (2017)	
City Homicides Population
Vancouver 19 658,354
Surrey 12 556,902
Abbotsford 9 145,184
Richmond 8 219,273
Kelowna 5 127,330
BC     (Total) 118 4,817,160
BC’s crime rate 
dropped by 
-4.1% to 74.2 
offences per 
1,000 people.
The homicide rate 
increased by 
+34%. With 118 
homicides in  
2017, there were 
30 more homicides 
than in 2016.
-2.9%
The overall 
number of 
Criminal Code 
offences decreased 
by -2.9%.
+3.8%
The overall 
number of 
weapons offences 
increased by 
+3.8%.
BC’s	TOP	FIVE	CRIMES (2017)	
Crime Number Rate/1,000
Theft 120,610 25.0
Mischief 44,141 9.2
Disturbing the Peace 40,929 8.5
Assault 29,139 6.0
Breaking & Entering 26,529 5.5
More on p. 34
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Highlights In This Issue
Drug Calls Admissible As Hearsay Evidence 4
Objectively Reasonable Honest Concerns Justified Entry 
On 911 Call
6
‘Policing Is A Team Sport’: Officers Entitled To Rely On 
Information Of Others
9
Girlfriend’s Plea For Arrestee To Talk Did Not Render 
Confession Involuntary
11
Reasonable Suspicion Addresses Possibility, Not 
Probability, Of Uncovering Criminality
13
Share It. Don’t Wear It. 15
Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths In 2018 16
BC’s Top Court Explains Reasonable Suspicion 20
Requiring ID From Passenger & Taking Back To Police 
Car Resulted In Detention
21
No Detention Arising From DNA Canvass 25
Police Need Not Articulate Specific Offence At Time Of 
Arrest
29
Upcoming External Learning Opportunities 35
Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for Fall 2018
Patrol Tactics for Frontline Supervisors @ 
New West Campus: November 5 – 9
Fundamentals of Police Instruction @ New 
West Campus: November 5 – 9
Major Crimes Investigations @ Victoria 
Campus: November 19 – 23 
Investigative Interviewing @ New West 
Campus: November 19 – 22 
          
Field Trainers @ New West Campus: 
November 28 – 30
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
To view other 2018 courses, 
go to http://bit.ly/plceadv 
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
The active reader: strategies for academic reading 
and writing.
Eric Henderson.
Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2018.
PE 1408 H462 2018
Applied empathy: the new language of 
leadership.
Michael Ventura.
New York, NY: Touchstone, 2018.
HD 57.7 V467 2018
Crime, media, and reality: examining mixed 
messages about crime and justice in popular 
media.
Venessa Garcia & Samantha G. Arkerson.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.
P 96 C74 G373 2018
Damaged: a first responder's experiences 
handling post-traumatic stress disorder.
James Meuer.
Bloomington, IN: WestBow Press, 2013.
RC 552 P67 M484 2013
Do less be more  ban busy and make space for 
what matters.
Susan Pearse & Martina Sheehan.
Carlsbad, CA: Hay House, Inc., 2017.
BF 637 S4 P429 2017
Experiential learning: a practical guide for 
training, coaching and education.
Colin Beard and John P. Wilson.
London; New York, NY: Kogan Page, 2018.
LB 1027.23 B43 2018
Exploding data: reclaiming our cyber security in 
the digital age.
Michael Chertoff.
New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2018.
KF 1263 C65 C44 2018
Fighting back: what an Olympic champion's story 
can teach us about recognizing and preventing 
child sexual abuse - and helping kids recover.
Kayla Harrison, Cynthia S. Kaplan & Blaise Aguirre.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2018.
HV 6570 H365 2018
Handbook of psychopathy.
edited by Christopher J. Patrick.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2018.
RC 555 H357 2018
Hyperfocus: how to be more productive in a 
world of distraction.
Chris Bailey.
Toronto, ON: Random House Canada, 2018.
BF 637 T5 B349 2018
Indigenous people and the criminal justice 
system : a practitioner's handbook.
Jonathan Rudin.
Toronto, ON: Emond, 2019.
KE 7709 R84 2019
Interpersonal conflict.
Joyce L. Hocker, William W. Wilmot.
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education, 2018.
HM 1121 W56 2018
Privacy in the workplace.
Éloïse Gratton & Lyndsay A. Wasser.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2017.
HF 5549.5 E428 P75 2017
Secur i t y su rve i l l ance cen te r s : de s i gn , 
implementation, and operation.
Anthony V. DiSalvatore, CPP, PSP, PCI, CFE, CLSD.
Boca  Raton, FL: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 
2017.
TK 7882 E2 D57 2017
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DRUG CALLS ADMISSIBLE AS 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE
R. v. Omar, 2018 ONCA 787 
A police officer received a  tip from a 
previously reliable confidential 
informer, that a black male with a big 
beard known as “J.J.” sold crack 
cocaine.  The tipster said that J.J. 
drove a black Jeep and provided its licence plate 
number. About a  month later, the  officer spotted the 
black Jeep in an area known for drug activity  and 
prostitution. The driver, who matched the 
description of J.J., parked the Jeep some distance 
from a building and then went inside.  A few 
minutes later, the driver returned to the Jeep and 
drove off.
The police began surveilling the Jeep and saw it go 
to another building where it again parked some 
distance from the entrance.  The Jeep left a short 
time later. The police followed the Jeep to a motel 
located in a known drug area. The driver took a 
back way to the motel, which the  police thought 
was consistent with the driver being surveillance 
conscious.  Once again, the  driver parked some 
distance from the motel. The driver went to a room, 
emerged a few minutes later and returned to his 
vehicle while talking on his cell phone.
At this point, the police 
decided to arrest the 
driver. They blocked in the 
Jeep and proceeded to 
effect the arrest. On arrest, 
the accused was found 
with a  cell phone and 
$100 on his person. A 
search of the Jeep revealed 
three  more  cell phones, a knife  and $1,175. At the 
police station, the accused was strip searched. The 
police found 20 grams of crack cocaine concealed 
in his underwear.
During the course of the arrest, at least two of the 
cell phones received calls. A police officer 
answered three calls on one of the cell phones and 
one call on another.  In each instance, the call was 
brief.  Language was used that indicated the caller 
was looking to purchase drugs.  Two of the callers 
expressly referred to J.J. The police did not make 
any effort to locate and interview these four callers, 
even though three  of the callers showed up on call 
display with either a  name, or a name and 
telephone number. No efforts were made to obtain 
authorization to search the telephones to see if 
there  was contact information in the phones that 
might match these callers.  Further, the evidence 
from the police  was that they had made efforts in 
the past to convince callers in such situations to be 
witnesses but they had never had any success in so 
doing.  The accused was charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and 
possessing proceeds of crime.
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused asserted that the police 
violated his ss. 8 and 9  Charter  rights 
when they arrested and searched him on 
the basis of the tip from the confidential 
informer. In his view, the seized evidence  should 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Sentencing Drug Traffickers
“The categorisation of drug traffickers as 
street-level, mid-level or high-level dealers 
and the application of the corresponding 
sentence ranges are useful tools to help 
assess the moral culpability of an offender in arriving at a fit 
sentence.  However, the determination of the appropriate 
category is not a scientific exercise; it involves the weighing of 
many factors.  There is no bright line dividing mid-level 
traffickers from high-level traffickers, nor is any one factor 
determinative.  The categories lie on a continuum and, 
depending on the particular circumstances, an offender could 
fall somewhere near the intersection of two categories.” – 
Manitoba Court of Appeal Justice Pfuetzner in upholding an eight 
year sentence for an accused convicted of trafficking cocaine and possessing a 
firearm, R. v. Bisson, 2018 MBCA 92 at para. 6. 


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    
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

        

        

       



 

          







      

      




        
       



    

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have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter. 
As well, the accused submitted that the drug calls 
made to the cellular telephones seized after his 
arrest were not admissible  as evidence under the 
principled exception to the hearsay rule. 
The judge rejected the accused’s Charter 
application and also admitted the evidence of the 
telephone calls. The judge found the tipster‘s 
information was compelling, the tipster had a 
measure of credibility and the information the 
tipster provided was corroborated by police 
surveillance of the accused’s activities. As for the 
admissibility of the cell phone calls under the 
principled exception to the hearsay rule, the judge 
found both requirements for admissibility had been 
met:
Reliability requirement: the evidence was 
reliable because  of its connection to the 
information provided by  the confidential 
informer and the observations made by  the 
police of the accused’s activities, all of which 
suggested drug dealing.  
Necessity requirement: the common sense 
reality that the callers would be unlikely, if 
located, to assist the police, coupled with the 
experience of the police officer in this case 
regarding the lack of cooperation of individuals 
in such circumstances.  
The accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking  and possessing 
proceeds of crime. He was sentenced to 18 months 
imprisonment.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
police did not have sufficient 
grounds to arrest and search 
him, and that the “drug calls” 
could not be used as evidence as they did not 
satisfy the requirements for admissibility of 
evidence under the principled exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
Reasonable Grounds
The Appeal Court found the trial judge properly 
considered the information provided by the 
confidential informer in upholding the  lawfulness 
of the arrest and search. The cumulative effect of 
the compelling nature of the information, the 
credibility of the informer and police corroboration 
of the information met the standard of reasonable 
grounds:
The information provided by the confidential 
informant was detailed, both with respect to the 
description of J.J. and also with respect to the 
black Jeep, including the licence plate number.  
The in formant had provided re l iable 
information to the police in the past.  And the 
police surveillance of the [accused] did provide 
corroboration for the information that the 
confidential informant had provided. [para. 12]
As the Court of Appeal noted, “weaknesses in one 
area may, to some extent, be compensated by 
strengths in the other two.”
The “Drug Calls”
Drug calls can be admitted 
as evidence in a criminal 
trial under the principled 
exception to the hearsay rule 
provided they meet both the 
necessity requirement and 
the reliability requirement. 
A l t h o u g h t h e r e i s n o 
categorical rule  concerning 
the admissibility of drug 
purchase calls, the number 
of calls is a significant factor 
in the admissibility analysis. 
“Here there were four separate calls, all of them clearly revealing efforts by the callers to 
purchase drugs.  It would ‘defy belief’ that all of these calls were erroneous or 
misunderstood.”
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In this case, the  trial judge properly  found both the 
necessity  and reliability requirements had been 
satisfied. 
Unlike a case involving a single telephone call 
suggesting that an accused was a drug dealer, this 
case  involved a quantity of calls sufficient to 
establish reliability. “Here there were four separate 
calls, all of them clearly revealing efforts by the 
callers to purchase drugs,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “It would ‘defy belief’ that all of these calls 
were erroneous or misunderstood.”  Furthermore, 
the number of calls can also satisfy the necessity 
requirement because the Crown could not be 
expected, where there are numerous declarants 
(callers), to locate  and convince most or all to 
testify at trial. As the Court of Appeal noted:
The failure of the police to undertake any 
efforts to locate any of these callers risks 
undermining a conclusion that the threshold 
necessity requirement is made out.   However, 
that risk is avoided by the particular 
circumstances of this case, notably, the number 
of calls received, that they were received in a 
short time frame (i.e. within minutes of each 
other), the specific contents of the calls clearly 
being to purchase drugs, and the unchallenged 
evidence of the police witness that prior efforts 
to enlist drug callers as witnesses had proved 
futile. [para. 19]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE 
HONEST CONCERNS JUSTIFIED 
ENTRY ON 911 CALL
R. v. Serban, 2018 BCCA 382
Police received a 911 call made 
from a payphone about a possible 
break and enter in progress at the 
accused’s residence. The caller 
claimed to be the homeowner and 
said that he had received a telephone call from his 
80-year-old father who was alone in the residence. 
The 911 caller said his father was frightened 
because  someone was attempting to 
break into the basement. The caller 
reported that his father’s name was 
“Pavel Serban” and provided a 
telephone number for his father, but 
the caller hung up when he was 
asked to provide his own name. The 
911 call-taker phoned the father’s 
number but received no answer.
Four police officers, including one 
with a police dog, responded to the 
911 call, which was dispatched as a 
“priority two call” (no confirmation of 
a l i fe-or-death emergency but 
considered to merit an immediate 
response). While on their way to the 
call, the officers were advised that the residence 
had been the subject of two previous tips 
concerning  a possible marijuana grow operation. 
This caused concern that the break-in could be a 
potential “grow rip” or a  home invasion carrying 
with it a significant risk for violence. When they 
arrived, officers conducted a perimeter search of 
the house and located a basement access at the 
rear. Police could smell fresh marijuana, heard the 
sounds of fans and saw equipment inside  a shed 
attached to the house consistent with a grow 
operation. But there was no sign of a break-in.
As the police examined the rear of the residence, 
the accused came out of a door located on the 
upper level. The officers walked up an exterior 
flight of stairs to meet the accused who identified 
himself as “Romeo Serban”. He denied making the 
911 call. When asked to produce identification, the 
accused re-entered the house in response and 
invited police inside. Once inside, the officers 
noticed the smell of fresh marijuana and saw a rifle 
resting  on a  cabinet. One of the officers, who had 
considerable experience in investigating marijuana 
grow operations, testified that the smell was very 
strong. He formed the view that a large amount of 
fresh marijuana was in the residence and arrested 
the accused for possessing it. The accused’s wife, 
two young children and three elderly people who 
were Romanian and did not speak English were 
also in the house but they did not appear in 
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distress. Two of the  elderly occupants were able to 
produce their Romanian passports to confirm their 
identity  but the other elderly man could not. As a 
result, the police could not confirm whether or not 
this man was “Pavel Serban” – the person named in 
the 911 call. 
Although the officers concluded that the 911 call 
was likely false, they decided to search the  entire 
residence to ensure that no one was inside who 
may have broken in and no other occupant of the 
house was in distress. The police systematically 
went from room to room and checked anywhere a 
person might be hiding. No one else was found 
inside the home. The basement, however, housed a 
substantial marijuana grow operation with plants in 
various stages of growth. The accused was arrested 
for producing marijuana, and a search warrant was 
obtained and executed. The grow operation, which 
covered the  entire basement floor, consisted of 
9,738 marijuana plants.
British Columbia Supreme Court
All of the attending  officers testified on a 
voir dire. One officer said he  considered 
this to be a high-risk call and that a 
canine unit is usually summoned in 
such situations because it is safer for a  dog to clear 
places and a dog can be used to track and 
apprehend an intruder. He also said that suspicions 
about whether a call might be false do not 
necessarily relieve the police of their obligation to 
investigate as if it were a legitimate complaint. 
Another officer said that grow rips sometimes 
involve violence if someone else is in the residence 
when the break-in occurs. The  officers testified that 
although they believed there was a marijuana grow 
operation in the house, they conducted a relatively 
brief search of the residence because they 
continued to have unresolved safety  concerns given 
the nature of the 911 call. And they all denied that 
the purpose of the search was to gather evidence. 
The accused argued the police  entered onto the 
property and conducted the search on the basis of 
ulterior motives, ie. to investigate  a possible  grow 
operation. He suggested the police ought to have 
concluded in very short order that the  911 call was 
false and therefore they acted unreasonably in 
carrying out any further search. 
The judge found all three stages of the police 
intrusion - the perimeter search of the home’s 
exterior, the entry into the residence and the 
clearance search - were reasonable under the 
Charter. The police  evidence was unequivocal that 
they continued to have safety concerns given the 
nature of the 911 call. The judge concluded that the 
police were “entirely justified in treating the call 
as legitimate and requiring them to investigate.” 
He accepted the evidence of the officers that 
information they received about the possibility that 
the residence was being used as a marijuana grow 
operation “heightened their concerns that the 
break-in could be a ‘grow rip’ which could 
increase the  prospect of violence.”  In his view, the 
search of the accused’s residence without a warrant 
was justified by the common law power of the 
police to conduct a warrantless search to protect 
life and safety in accordance with the principles set 
out in R. v. Godoy, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311. There were 
no s. 8 Charter  breaches and the accused was 
convicted of producing and possessing marihuana 
for the purpose of trafficking.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
clearance search was not a 
justifiable  use of police powers 
b e c a u s e i t wa s n e i t h e r 
necessary  nor objectively reasonable. He asserted 
that any legitimate concern for the safety of the 
occupants had evaporated before the clearance 
search was conducted. In his view, the police 
concluded that the 911 call was false before the 
“The police were aware of the potential that the break and enter in progress 911 call 
concerned a “grow rip”. It bears repeating that “[a] 911 call is a distress call -- a cry for 
help” that obliges the police to “assume that the caller is in some distress and requires 
immediate assistance”.
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clearance search was undertaken. Thus, the  police 
must have had ulterior motives for the search, ie. 
to gather evidence in aid of an ongoing “grow op” 
investigation. He contended that the judge ought 
to have found that the clearance search breached 
his s. 8 rights and the evidence should have been 
excluded under s. 24(2).
Justice Fitch, authoring the unanimous Court of 
Appeal decision, disagreed with the accused. He 
first noted that “whether an unauthorized search 
is justified in the exercise of an established police 
duty is a fact-driven inquiry that will turn on the 
circumstances of the individual case.”  He 
continued:
As is apparent, the [trial] judge found that the 
conduct of the police was motivated by a 
desire to fully investigate the circumstances of 
the 911 call, locate the subject of the call 
(Pavel Serban), and ensure the occupants of 
the residence were safe. In essence, the judge 
concluded that the concerns of the police 
were honest ly held and object ively 
reasonable on the information known to 
them. He did not, as the [accused] asserts, 
conclude that the concerns raised by the 911 
call had been alleviated at the time of the 
clearance search. 
In my view, there was a basis upon which the 
judge could reasonably come to the 
conclusion he did. The police were aware of 
the potential that the break and enter in 
progress 911 call concerned a “grow rip”. It 
bears repeating that “[a] 911 call is a distress 
call -- a cry for help” that obliges the police to 
“assume that the caller is in some distress and 
requires immediate ass is tance”.  The 
information conveyed to the investigating 
officers understandably elevated their 
assessment of the risk for violence in the 
residence. On their initial entry at the 
invitation of the [accused], they saw a 
weapon in the home. They knew there were 
children in the home. The subject of the call 
had not been identified when the clearance 
search was conducted. They were unable, due 
to language difficulties, to communicate with 
the three elderly individuals in the residence. 
The police believed the residence was being 
used by the [accused] for the commission of a 
drug-related offence. They were, as a 
consequence, justified in treating with caution 
the insistence of the [accused] that all was 
well. [references omitted, paras. 26-27]
Justice Fitch did not accept the accused’s 
submission that the police had viable options to 
ensure the safety of the occupants short of 
conducting  the clearance search. The police could 
not simply ask the occupants of the residence 
whether any of them wanted the residence 
“cleared” by the police because there was a 
language barrier and police were unable to 
communicate  with some of them. “Further, on all 
that was known to them, including the criminal 
activity they reasonably believed was occurring 
inside the premises, the police were justified in 
not deferring to the stated wishes of those who 
were present and able to communicate in 
English,” said Justice Fitch. “The [accused’s] 
alternative submission that the occupants of the 
residence could have been taken outside and 
questioned without engaging in the clearance 
search would have done nothing to alleviate the 
officers’ safety-based concerns about what might 
be taking place inside the residence.”
In this case, the circumstances that prompted the 
911 call had not been addressed before the 
clearance search had been conducted. Nor did 
the police exaggerate safety-based concerns in an 
effort to justify  a warrantless search conducted for 
the primary purpose of gathering evidence. The 
trial judge did not err in concluding that the 
police were justified in conducting a  relatively 
brief clearance search of the residence to ensure 
that its occupants were safe. Since there was no s. 
8 breach, there was no need to consider s. 24(2). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
“Whether an unauthorized search is 
justified in the exercise of an established 
police duty is a fact-driven inquiry that will 
turn on the circumstances of the 
individual case.”
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POLICING IS A TEAM SPORT: 
OFFICERS ENTITLED TO RELY 
ON INFORMATION OF OTHERS
R. v. Warsame, 2018 ABCA 329
  
The police received information 
from informers that drug trafficking 
was taking place from a particular 
house. The information reported that 
those involved would meet at a 
playground across the  street for the actual 
exchange of drugs and money. The police set up 
surveillance and observed a number of brief 
interactions near the target house  which they 
interpreted as being drug  transactions. Some of 
those involved were known to have prior records 
related to drugs. A police officer, acting as an 
affiant, subsequently  obtained a  search warrant for 
the target residence. The affiant did not deal 
directly with the  informants, but relied on 
information received from their “handlers” as well 
as information received from the surveillance 
officers. When the warrant was executed police 
found 684 grams of crack cocaine, 44 grams of soft 
cocaine, seven cell phones, a loaded Smith and 
Wesson .44 Magnum pistol, and $28,740. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The only issue at trial was the sufficiency 
of the Information to Obtain (ITO) 
underlying the telewarrant. The accused 
argued that the  ITO was insufficient to 
justify the warrant, raising a number of issues:
1. The ITO only contained a “boilerplate” 
statement about how the informants came to 
possess the information they provided;
2. There may have been innocent explanations for 
the interactions police  interpreted as drug 
transactions;
3. The affiant did not deal directly with the 
informants or relied on information from the 
surveillance officers; 
4. There was some uncertainty about who resided 
in the target residence; and 
5. The information was incomplete and 
inconsistent in some respects. 
The the judge concluded that the ITO provided 
adequate grounds for the police to obtain the 
warrant. The judge was satisfied that, after a 
thorough reading  of the ITO, any justice of the 
peace reviewing the ITO would grant the  warrant. 
Based on this ruling, the accused did not dispute 
that the Crown could prove all of the essential 
elements of the offence. The accused was convicted 
for possessing cocaine for the purposes of 
trafficking, possessing the proceeds of crime, and 
possessing a prohibited firearm and ammunition. 
He was sentenced to six years in prison.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge failed to provide 
sufficient reasons in dismissing 
his Charter  application. The 
Crown, on the other hand, contended that no 
substantial wrong or miscarriage  of justice occurred 
because  the ITO contained overwhelming grounds 
supporting the issuance  of the search warrant. The 
Court of Appeal addressed each one of the 
accused’s submissions:
• “Information about the Informants. The 
[accused] argued that the Information to 
Obtain was deficient, because it only 
contained a “boilerplate” statement about how 
the informants came to possess the information 
they provided. It is stated that the information 
came from either (a) personal observation, (b) 
statements by the person being investigated, or 
(c) information that was overheard. The 
[accused] also argued that since the full 
criminal records of the informants were not 
disclosed, the issuing justice had no basis to 
assess their credibility.
Relying on information received from 
informants creates a tension between 
protecting the informer privilege and the right 
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of the accused to make full answer and 
defence. The Crown, the police  and the court 
have no ability to waive the informer privilege, 
which must be studiously protected. Being too 
precise about the source of the informants’ 
information, or providing too much detail 
about their criminal records, might well expose 
their identity. The informant privilege can only 
be compromised when it is absolutely essential 
because  innocence is at stake. The [accused] 
has not demonstrated that merely attempting to 
undermine the credibility  of the informants, so 
as to undermine the foundation of the warrant, 
meets that test. Accordingly, any gaps in the 
information provided about the informants did 
n o t p r e c l u d e t h e i s s u a n c e o f t h e 
warrant. [references omitted, paras. 8-9]
• “Ambivalent transactions. The surveillance 
officers observed a number of brief interactions 
near the target house which they interpreted as 
being drug transactions. Some of those 
involved were known to have prior records 
relating to drugs. The [accused] argued that 
there  may have been innocent explanations for 
those interactions, but the mere possibility of 
innocent explanations does not preclude the 
officers from having reasonable grounds to 
believe that the transactions were criminal in 
nature. [reference omitted, para. 10]
• “Reliance on Secondary Information. The 
officer who swore the affidavit in support of the 
warrant did not deal directly  with the 
informants, but relied on information received 
from their “handlers”. Further, the  affiant relied 
on information received from the surveillance 
officers. In order to preserve the informer 
privilege, it is common to have only a limited 
number of officers deal directly with the 
informants. Further, policing is a team sport, 
and one officer is entitled to rely on 
information received from other officers. 
[reference omitted, para. 11]
• “Uncertain Identity. One informant suggested 
that ‘Tyler’ was trafficking in drugs, while 
another suggested it was ‘Mohammed’, and 
there  was arguably  some inconsistency as to 
who actually resided in the target house. 
Inconsistencies in the evidence do not 
preclude the formation of reasonable grounds 
to believe an offence is occurring, as the test is 
not proof on a balance of probabilities. The 
warrant was focused on the  particular 
premises, and it was not unreasonable to 
believe that more than one person, or at least 
one person, was trafficking drugs from that 
location. [reference omitted, para. 12]
• “Overall reliability. The [accused] argued that 
the information was in some respects 
i n c o m p l e t e , a n d i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s 
contradictory. The historic reliability of the 
informants was not well established. Again, it 
was not necessary  for the police to establish on 
a balance of probabilities that an offence was 
being committed from the target house. 
Corroboration of the informants is not 
essential. There was sufficient evidence on this 
record for the warrant to be issued. [reference 
omitted, para. 13]
“While the evidence was not perfect, it was 
sufficient to support the warrant,” said the Court of 
Appeal. “The record before the authorizing judge 
“Relying on information received from informants creates a tension between protecting 
the informer privilege and the right of the accused to make full answer and defence. The 
Crown, the police and the court have no ability to waive the informer privilege, which must 
be studiously protected. Being too precise about the source of the informants’ 
information, or providing too much detail about their criminal records, might well expose 
their identity. The informant privilege can only be compromised when it is absolutely 
essential because innocence is at stake.”
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confirmed that there were sufficient grounds for 
the warrant.” The warrant was properly issued and 
there  was no miscarriage of justice. The  accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
 
Editor’s note: Additional information taken from 
R. v. Warsame, 2017 ABCA 239.
GIRLFRIEND’s PLEA FOR 
ARRESTEE TO TALK DID NOT 
RENDER CONFESSION 
INVOLUNTARY
R. v. Lavallee, 2018 ABCA 328
 
Following a shooting where  the  victim 
was shot in the face twice with a .22 
calibre rifle but survived, the accused 
was extensively interviewed by police 
over a two day period. During the 
interview, which was video recorded, the police 
used numerous tactics to elicit a confession. The 
police played recordings to the accused in which 
the victim’s mother and the accused’s sisters begged 
him to confess. The police hung pictures of the 
accused’s daughter in the interview room and 
appealed to his moral obligation to be honest and 
do the right thing. Additionally, because the 
circumstances suggested that the crime was gang-
related, the police talked to the accused about 
gangs and the gang code of conduct as a further 
way to try to elicit a confession. 
On the second day of the interview, the police 
arranged a telephone call between the accused and 
another individual present at the shooting, a 
potential accomplice. This other individual had 
become a cooperative police witness under some 
form of police protection. During  the telephone 
call, the individual told the accused that the 
“higher ups would obviously rather this all go 
away”. He told the accused: “I want you to be able 
to go about having a regular life without having to 
look over your shoulders and you know, and to be 
able to breathe freely”.  
About 40 minutes after the telephone call ended, 
the police arranged for the accused’s girlfriend to 
visit him in the interview room. The girlfriend told 
the accused that, if he knew anything, he had to tell 
police. She told him she had admitted to the police 
her role in an unrelated break and enter offence, 
and she then said, “We need to get this out of our 
lives so we can start over, right. We can’t have a 
fresh start with the  past haunting us. Okay. You 
know I love you. You know that’s why I’m sitting 
here right now. I need you to do the right thing.” 
Shortly after the girlfriend left the interview room, 
the accused confessed to the shooting, stating: 
“[Y]eah, I shot Donnie. I’m sorry for shooting 
Donnie. Right. I am.” 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge watched the video of the 
pol ice interview and heard the 
testimony of the officers involved. The 
judge noted that the police were 
creative in their interviewing techniques, but that 
they acted respectfully and there was nothing  in 
their behaviour to raise any kind of doubt as to the 
voluntariness of the accused’s confession. Although 
the potential accomplice  to the crime was an 
individual with a criminal record and a  reputation 
for violence who was a member of a notorious 
gang, there  was no evidence to suggest that the 
accused was the least bit intimidated or concerned 
about this individual or the gang they were 
involved with. After all, the  accused himself had 
been a member of several gangs and was quite 
familiar with what they were capable of. And the 
accused seemed concerned that he would be seen 
as someone who might implicate others (a  “rat”) 
rather than appearing fearful or threatened. 
The accused did not share other details of the 
shooting even after he admitted to shooting the 
victim. Such details, according  to the judge, could 
have implicated others and the accused’s refusal to 
share such details demonstrated that his will (to 
“not talk”) remained steadfast.  Furthermore, the 
accused’s will was not overcome by anything other 
than his love for his girlfriend and her professed 
love for him, and her plea to him to tell the police 
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what he knew. Although the girlfriend was an agent 
of the state at the time of her attendance at the 
police interview, the judge found the type of 
pressure exerted by her was not precluded by the 
confessions rule.  The accused’s confession was 
voluntarily, it was admitted as evidence and he was 
convicted of attempted murder. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused contended that the 
trial judge erred, among other 
things, in finding that his 
confession was freely and 
voluntarily given. In his view, the judge misapplied 
and misinterpreted the test for voluntariness. He 
submitted that the potential accomplice’s “scare 
call” during the interview should have raised a 
reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of his 
confession.
Voluntariness
The Crown bears the burden of proving a 
confession is voluntary  beyond a reasonable doubt. 
“The common law confessions rule  ‘requires proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the voluntariness of 
any statement obtained from an accused by a 
person in authority  before it may be admitted in 
evidence’,”  said the Court of Appeal. “As to 
whether a statement was made voluntarily, the 
inquiry focusses predominantly on the ability of 
the accused to make a meaningful choice whether 
to confess.” In assessing voluntariness, a contextual 
fact-based approach to the evidence is used. Since 
few suspects will spontaneously confess to a crime, 
the police will have to somehow convince the 
suspect that it is in his best interest to confess. It is 
only  when an inducement, standing alone or in 
combination with other facts, is strong enough to 
raise  a reasonable doubt as to whether the  will of 
the accused has been overborne  that attempts to 
convince a suspect to confess will be improper. 
“The most important consideration in such cases is 
to look for a  quid pro quo  offer, regardless of 
whether it  comes in the form of a threat or 
promise (ibid). It is the strength of the 
inducement, having regard to the particular 
individual and his or her circumstances, that is to 
be considered in the overall contextual analysis 
into the voluntariness of the accused’s statement,” 
said the Court of Appeal. 
In this case, the trial judge was alive to and 
specifically  considered the accused’s concern as to 
the possibility  of a threat from the potential 
accomplice’s telephone call. In the trial judge’s 
view, there was “nothing to suggest that [the 
accused] was the  least bit intimidated or 
concerned about [the potential accomplice] or 
the...gang, except that he did not want to be seen 
as a rat.”  The trial judge suggested the only thing 
that may have overcome the accused’s will (in 
terms of providing the impetus for him to confess) 
was his love for his girlfriend and her professed 
love for him, and her plea to him to tell the police 
what he knew. However, while the girlfriend was 
an agent of the state when she attended the police 
interview, the type of pressure she exerted on the 
accused was insufficient to render his confession 
involuntary. 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the  trial judge 
did not misapprehend the test for voluntariness and 
correctly applied the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard of proof in holding that the Crown had 
met its burden with respect to the admissibility  of 
the accused’s confession.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
 Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“The common law confessions rule ‘requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
voluntariness of any statement obtained from an accused by a person in authority 
before it may be admitted in evidence’.As to whether a statement was made voluntarily, 
the inquiry focusses predominantly on the ability of the accused to make a meaningful 
choice whether to confess.” 
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 REASONABLE SUSPICION 
ADDRESSES POSSIBILITY, NOT 
PROBABILITY, OF UNCOVERING 
CRIMINALITY
R. v. Tummillo, 2018 MBCA 95             
 
While towing a trailer with a boat on 
it, the accused drove his truck through 
a red light into an intersection on a 
well-travelled highway. As he entered 
the intersection, the accused collided 
with another vehicle.  The passengers in the other 
vehicle included three children between 11 and 14 
years of age. Each of the children sustained serious 
injuries including intracranial haemorrhages, 
fractures, lacerations, concussions,  abrasions and 
embedded glass. 
When the investigating officer arrived at the scene 
of the collision, fire crew and ambulance 
paramedics were already there.  One of the fire 
crew members told the officer that the accused had 
run the red light, smelled of alcohol and was 
believed to be intoxicated.  As a  result, after 
speaking with and observing the accused, the 
officer placed the accused in his cruiser car, 
demanded a breath sample and transported him to 
the local detachment.
At the  detachment, the accused spoke to a lawyer.  
He subsequently gave two breath samples with 
readings of 140 mg% and 120 mg%. Since the 
samples were taken more than two hours after the 
driving occurred, an expert established that, at the 
time of driving, the accused’s blood alcohol 
concentration was between 152 mg% and 184 
mg%. The accused also gave a video statement. He 
said that the light was green when he entered the 
intersection, that he had a witness but did not take 
down that person’s name and that he did not think 
that his blood alcohol level was over 80 mg% at 
the time he was driving. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued, in part, that 
comments he made to the officer at the 
scene of the collision and at the police 
station, as well as the certificate of 
analysis of his breath samples, should have  been 
excluded from evidence.  In his view, the police 
breached his ss.7, 8 and 9 Charter rights. He said 
he sustained a significant ankle injury  as well as 
neck strain and light-headedness from the collision 
and did not receive the necessary medical 
treatment as required by s. 7. The judge concluded 
that the accused’s s. 7 Charter right had not been 
violated because he did not mention that there was 
anything wrong to either the officer or the breath 
technician on the day of the collision. The judge 
also dismissed the accused’s s. 9 claim that the 
officer did not have reasonable grounds to suspect 
that he had been involved in any criminal activity 
when he was detained at the scene of the 
collision.  Finally, the judge ruled that the officer 
had reasonable grounds to make the breath 
demand, thereby rejecting the accused’s  asertion 
that his s. 8 right had been infringed. The accused 
was convicted on three counts of causing bodily 
harm while operating a motor vehicle with a blood 
alcohol concentration over 80 mg%.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused again argued, 
among other grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in failing to 
find a s. 7 Charter breach 
regarding the lack of medical assistance provided 
to him. He also contended he was arbitrarily 
detained under s. 9 and the officer breached his s. 
8 right by making a breath demand during  the 
course  of his detention absent reasonable grounds 
to believe that he had committed an offence.
INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR 
THE ELIMINATION OF 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
November 25
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s. 7 – Failure to Provide Medical Attention
Justice Cameron, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
found the trial judge did not err in finding no s. 7 
breach. The accused did not mention that he was 
injured to police nor did he request medical 
attention. Nor did the officer or the breath 
technician notice anything remarkable about the 
accused’s emotional condition or observe any 
physical injuries. 
As for the accused’s assertion that the nature of the 
accident should have prompted the  police to 
question him as to whether he required medical 
assistance, the Court of Appeal rejected this notion 
finding there was no factual foundation to this 
argument:
[The accused] was able to walk to the police 
cruiser car after the accident and able to walk 
from the cruiser car to the police detachment.  
He was responsive to police questions and able 
to understand their statements to him. He 
understood his rights. He did not mention any 
discomfort.  [para. 65]
s. 9: Arbitrary Detention? 
Justice Cameron found the trial judge properly 
considered the constellation of circumstances in 
finding there was sufficient evidence for the officer 
to reasonably suspect that the accused had been 
impaired by the consumption of alcohol at the time 
of the collision. These circumstances included:
• There had been a collision with three damaged 
vehicles; 
• The accused was standing at the driver’s side of 
a badly damaged truck; 
• The accused admitted the truck was his; and
• The information from the fire crew member 
that the accused was alleged to have gone 
through a red light, smelled of alcohol and was 
believed to be impaired.
“All that was required was that the officer have a 
reasonable suspicion that the accused committed 
the offence,” said Justice Cameron.   “A reasonable 
suspicion is something more than a mere suspicion 
and something less than a belief based on 
reasonable and probable grounds.  Otherwise 
stated, the reasonable suspicion standard 
addresses the ‘possibility of uncovering criminality 
and not a probability of doing so’.”  
                     
s. 8: Unreasonable Breath Demand?
The Court of Appeal also concluded that the  trial 
judge properly found that the officer had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the  accused had 
committed the offence of driving while his ability to 
do so was impaired by alcohol within the 
preceding three hours.   In addition to the evidence 
relied upon in determining that the accused was 
not arbitrarily  detained, the officer made 
observations that the accused had a lumbering gait 
as he walked to the cruiser car, that he smelled of 
alcohol and that he needed to hold on to the 
cruiser car for support. The officer not only had a 
subjective belief that the accused had committed 
the offence but his belief was objectively 
reasonable.  
The officer was not required to take steps to discern 
whether there were causes other than impairment 
that would explain the observations he made of the 
accused.  “It is trite law that an officer is not 
required to consider all of the alternative 
explanations for the observed conduct relied on to 
form reasonable grounds to make a breath 
demand,” said Justice Cameron.  
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“All that was required was that the officer have a reasonable suspicion that the accused 
committed the offence. A reasonable suspicion is something more than a mere suspicion 
and something less than a belief based on reasonable and probable grounds. Otherwise 
stated, the reasonable suspicion standard addresses the ‘possibility of uncovering 
criminality and not a probability of doing so’.”  
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2018
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January  1, 2008 to August 31, 2018. 
In August there were 98 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents a -20% decrease over the 
number of deaths occurring in August 2017 and a 
-27% decrease over July 2018. The August 2018 
statistics amount to about 3 people dying every 
day of the month.
In July  2018 there were 134 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents an 12%  increase 
over the number of deaths occurring in July 2017. 
There were a total of 972 illicit drug overdose 
deaths from January through August 2018. This is 
86 fewer deaths than last year’s total at this time.  
The 1,452  overdose deaths last year (2017) 
amounted to more  than a 336%  over 2013. 
Moreover, the report attributes fentanyl laced drugs 
as accounting for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2018 with 264  illicit drug  overdose deaths 
followed by 50-59 year-olds at 228  deaths. People 
aged 40-49 years-old had 205  deaths while those 
aged 19-29 had 180  deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 256 followed by Surrey (131), 
Victoria (64), Kelowna (40), Prince George (29), 
Kamloops (25) and Nanaimo (25). 
Males continue to die at almost a 4:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January to August 
2018, 777 males have died while there were 195 
female deaths.
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The 2018 data indicates that most illicit drug 
overdose deaths (86.7%) occurred inside while 
12.1% occurred outside. For 11 deaths, the 
location was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 29 months preceding the 
declaration (Nov 2013-Mar 2016) totaled 1,183. 
The number of deaths in the 29 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Aug 2018) totaled 
3,197. This is an increase of 170%.
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Source: -Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2008 to 
August 31, 2018.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. September 27, 2018.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were fentanyl, which 
was detected in 75.6% of deaths, cocaine (48.4%), methamphetamine/amphetamine (31.2%), ethyl 
alcohol (25.8%), and heroin (23.3%). 
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BC’s TOP COURT EXPLAINS 
REASONABLE SUSPICION
Mackenzie v. British Columbia 
(Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 
2018 BCCA 354
In an appeal by BC’s Superintendent 
of Motor Vehicles over the setting 
aside of an Immediate Roadside 
Prohibition (IRP), the BC Court of 
Appeal restated some well-established 
principles on the application of the reasonable 
suspicion standard required for a  roadside breath 
test under s.  254(2)  of the  Criminal Code. Justice 
Fitch, delivering the decision for the Court of 
Appeal, described reasonable suspicion as follows:
There is both a subjective and objective aspect 
to the reasonable suspicion standard.
The demanding officer must subjectively 
entertain an honest suspicion that the detained 
driver has alcohol in his or her body. Credibility 
issues and the need to make factual findings as 
a consequence thereof will most commonly 
arise in resolving whether the officer 
subjectively entertained the requisite honest 
suspicion.
Further, the suspicion must be based on 
objectively verifiable circumstances which, 
taken together and subjected to independent 
judicial scrutiny, establish that the suspicion 
subjectively entertained by the officer was 
reasonable. The inquiry i s based on 
circumstances known to the police officer at 
the time and asks whether it was reasonable, 
based on the totality of those circumstances, for 
the officer to suspect that the driver had alcohol 
in his or her body. The objective component of 
the test may be framed in these terms: 
“[W]ould a reasonable person, standing in the 
shoes of the investigating police officer and 
aware of all of the objectively verifiable 
evidence, reasonably suspect the driver had 
alcohol in his or her body?”
The inquiry is “fact-based, flexible, and 
grounded in common sense and practical, 
everyday experience”.
The reasonable suspicion standard engages the 
reasonable possibility, not probability, that a 
driver has alcohol in his or her body. 
Application of the standard means that in some 
cases a police officer will reasonably suspect 
that a driver has alcohol in his or her body 
based on circumstances that are subsequently 
determined to be attributable to an innocent 
explanation. For example, an officer might 
reasonably suspect that a driver has alcohol in 
his or her body based on the detection of a 
strong odour of liquor coming from the area of 
the vehicle in which the driver is seated. In 
such a case, the officer might reasonably 
attribute the odour to the driver. That the source 
of the odour might later be determined to be 
coming from liquor spilled on the floor boards 
underneath the driver’s feet, and not 
attributable to the driver’s consumption of 
alcohol, does not necessarily mean that the 
officer’s suspicion was unreasonable.
While a police officer is obliged to take into 
account the totality of the circumstances, 
including exculpatory, neutral or equivocal 
information known to the police officer at the 
relevant time, the officer does not have an 
obligation to undertake an investigation to rule 
out possible innocent explanations for sensory 
observations or observed behaviour. … “[T]he 
reviewing court is not to consider whether the 
investigating officer’s suspicion was accurate or 
whether other inferences could be drawn from 
the constellation of circumstances, or to 
consider whether the investigating officer could 
have taken further steps to confirm or dispel 
a  prima facie  reasonably held suspicion that 
alcohol was present in the driver’s body”. As 
applied to this case, there might, for instance, 
be an innocent explanation for the wobble of 
the [driver’s] motorbike as it left the intersection 
and for what [the officer] said about the 
[driver’s] difficulty in retrieving his driver’s 
licence from his wallet (assuming that this latter 
observation was made before the ASD 
“The reasonable suspicion standard engages the reasonable possibility, not probability, 
that a driver has alcohol in his or her body.”
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demand). The existence of possible innocent 
explanations does not necessarily take these 
observations out of the mix. The officer is 
entitled to take these observations into account 
as part of the totality of the circumstances.
Importantly, the reasonable suspicion inquiry 
cannot logically take account of circumstances 
learned after the demand was made. If, for 
example, [the officer’s] observation that the 
[driver] had difficulty extracting his driver’s 
licence from his wallet was made after the ASD 
demand …, it is not a factor that could be taken 
into account in determining whether the 
officer’s suspicion that the [driver] had alcohol 
in his body was reasonable at the time of the 
demand.
… While objectively discernible  indicia  of 
impairment may be sufficient to ground a valid 
ASD demand, such observations are not 
necessary to the making of a valid demand. A 
detaining officer who is found to have detected 
a strong odour of liquor on the mouth of a 
driver but no observable signs of impairment 
will, in all likelihood, have a reasonable 
suspicion that the driver has alcohol in his or 
her body.
… An officer may reasonably suspect that a 
driver has alcohol in his or her body based on 
mouth odour even if the driver refuses to 
respond when questioned as to when he or she 
consumed their last drink. Alternatively, an 
officer may reasonably suspect that a driver has 
alcohol in his or her body based on 
other indicia of impairment in the absence of a 
detectable odour of liquor on the driver’s 
breath. [references omitted, paras. 34-42]
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
REQUIRING ID FROM 
PASSENGER & TAKING IT BACK 
TO POLICE CAR RESULTED IN 
DETENTION
R. v. Loewen, 2018 SKCA 69
Saskatchewan police stopped a 
vehicle  for speeding in the early 
morning hours. The driver was asked 
for his licence and registration. The 
accused, a passenger in the vehicle, 
was also asked for identification. He produced a 
Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) photo 
identification card. Police conducted CPIC checks 
on both occupants and learned the driver had an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest  in Alberta and a 
criminal record, while the accused was a federal 
inmate on statutory release with conditions. Police 
called  Corrections  Canada’s National Monitoring 
Centre  (NMC) and determined that the accused was 
not be in the presence of known criminals. The 
NMC official told police that a warrant under 
Canada’s Corrections and Conditional Release Act 
would be issued for the accused’s apprehension 
and police were to take him into custody. The 
driver was subsequently issued a ticket for speeding 
while the  accused was removed from the vehicle 
and  arrested  for breach of his release  conditions.  
The driver then departed the scene.
Immediately upon his  arrest  and being advised of 
the reason for it, the accused told police that his 
“parole” had expired two days prior. The police 
took no steps to investigate this claim. Police told 
the accused that the  NMC was issuing a warrant 
and the matter was no longer within police 
discretion. Police searched the accused and found 
his wallet (containing $1,615), two cellphones and 
some keys.  The accused was advised of his right to 
counsel and transported to the police station. He 
again raised the  concern that his “parole” had 
expired. The accused was again searched and a 
“While a police officer is obliged to take 
into account the totality of the 
circumstances, including exculpatory, 
neutral or equivocal information known 
to the police officer at the relevant time, 
the officer does not have an obligation 
to undertake an investigation to rule out 
possible innocent explanations for 
sensory observations or observed 
behaviour.”
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bulge was felt in his groin area. When asked what it 
was, the accused said it was cocaine and MDMA. 
He subsequently removed two packages of drugs 
containing 28.3 grams of cocaine and 28.1 grams 
of methylone from his underwear. A further search 
was then conducted and the accused’s clothing was 
removed and replaced one piece at a time.  He 
was  then arrested  for possessing a controlled 
substance for the purpose of trafficking and was re-
read the standard police warnings. 
Although a faxed warrant was received from the 
NMC, the police subsequently received a call  from 
them reporting that the accused’s release term had 
been completed and the warrant for his 
apprehension was invalid. As it turned out, the 
warrant was invalid on its face in that it stated the 
accused was on statutory release ending two days 
earlier. Police advised the accused that he was not 
facing any charges for breaching  his release 
conditions but that his subsequent  arrest  for 
possessing a controlled substance for the purpose 
of trafficking was still in effect. The accused was 
charged with possessing cocaine for the purpose  of 
trafficking, possessing methylone for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime. 
Saskatchewan Provincial Court
The officer testified that he did not 
request the accused’s identification in 
relation to any traffic offence. Instead, 
the officer said he always requests 
identification from passengers when he conducts a 
traffic stop so it can be checked on the CPIC 
database. He does this “to find people who are 
either breaching court ordered conditions, wanted 
on warrants, outstanding criminals, that type of 
thing as part of [his] job”.  As for the arrest, the 
officers said it was based on the warrant issued by 
the NMC.  
The judge ruled that the accused’s rights under s. 9 
had not been violated by the police asking him to 
provide his name and identification nor had his s. 8 
rights been breached when the police used his 
name to run a search on CPIC. However, the judge 
found the accused had been arbitrarily detained 
when he  was  arrested  before a warrant had been 
issued. The search incidental to his  arrest  was 
therefore unreasonable under s. 8 because 
the  arrest  itself was unlawful. Furthermore, the 
search of the accused’s wallet was not justified 
because  it was not proper as an incident to 
the arrest. As for the searches at the police station, 
the judge concluded they were reasonable because 
the accused had been taken into custody. Finally, 
there  was no s.  10(b) Charter  breach when the 
police asked the accused questions before he had 
an opportunity  to speak with counsel. Despite the 
Charter infringements, the evidence of the  drugs 
and cash were nonetheless admissible under s. 
24(2). The accused was convicted of possessing 
methylone for the purpose of trafficking and 
possessing  cocaine, but he was acquitted of 
possessing proceeds of crime since the judge was 
unconvinced that the cash represented the 
proceeds of drug sales. The accused was sentenced 
to 42 months in prison.
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued that he 
had been arbitrarily detained 
both when the officer took his 
identification and when he 
was arrested. Moreover, he contended that he was 
unreasonably searched immediately after his 
arrest  and at the police station. In his view, these 
Charter violations warranted the exclusion of the 
evidence under s. 24(2). 
The Court of Appeal agreed with the accused, 
finding he had experienced four violations of 
his Charter rights: (1) when he was detained while 
the police did the  CPIC and local records checks 
and deal t wi th NMC; (2)  when he was 
unlawfully  arrested; (3) when he was searched at 
the roadside  incidental to the unlawful arrest; and 
(4) when he was searched at the police station.
Detention on Receipt & Holding of ID
The Court of Appeal ruled that the accused was 
arbitrarily detained in violation of s.  9 of 
the Charter at the point when the officer asked him 
for his identification and took  it back to the police 
vehicle. The test for detention was explained:  
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The onus of establishing the existence of 
psychological detention is, of course, on the 
individual alleging the detention. The test 
involves an objective determination made in 
light of the circumstances as a whole and the 
court must be satisfied by the evidence that the 
conduct of the police or state officials effected 
a significant deprivation of liberty. [para. 28]
The question … is whether [the accused] has 
established that a reasonable person in his 
circumstances would have concluded that he 
or she had been deprived of his or her liberty 
when [the officer] walked away with the 
identification. Any such deprivation must have 
been significant in order to trigger s. 9 of 
the Charter. [para. 41]
In cases where that had been no physical restraint, 
the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Grant, 2009 
SCC 32 outlined a number of factors for courts to 
consider in determining whether there has been a 
psychological detention: 
• The circumstances giving rise to the encounter 
as they would reasonably  be perceived by the 
individual: whether the police were providing 
general assistance; maintaining general order; 
making general inquiries regarding  a particular 
occurrence; or, singling out the individual for 
focussed investigation. 
• The nature of the police conduct, including the 
language used; the use of physical contact; the 
place where the interaction occurred; the 
presence of others; and the duration of the 
encounter. 
• The particular characteristics or circumstances 
of the individual where relevant, including age; 
physical stature; minority status; level of 
sophistication. 
Here, the Court of Appeal held the accused was 
psychologically detained:
Taking a l l o f the  Grant  fac tors in to 
consideration, I conclude that [the accused] 
suffered a significant deprivation of his liberty 
when [the officer] took his identification back 
to the police car. An SGI identification card is 
not something that can be easily abandoned. A 
citizen in [the accused’s] circumstances would 
have reasonably concluded he or she had no 
meaningful option but remain in the vehicle 
until the police returned with the identification. 
“Police reliance on erroneous information may be considered objectively reasonable 
‘unless, in the circumstances at play in the arrest situation, the police could reasonably 
have made inquiries which would have led to the discovery of the deficiencies or defects’ 
in that information.”
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Arbitrary Detention
“Section 9 provides that “[e]veryone has the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
i m p r i s o n e d ” . H o w e v e r , n o t e v e r y 
interaction between an individual and the 
police is a detention. Section 9 does not oblige the police to 
“abstain from interacting with members of the public until 
they have specific grounds to connect the individual to the 
commission of a crime”. Further, the police may engage in 
the preliminary questioning of bystanders without creating 
a detention within the meaning of s. 9. 
Section  9 is engaged only by “significant physical or 
psychological restraint”. Psychological detention arises 
where an individual has a legal obligation to comply with a 
restrictive police directive or where “a reasonable person 
would conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or 
she had no choice but to comply”.   - Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal Chief Justice Richards in R. v. Loewen, 2018 SKCA 69  at 
paras. 25-26, references omitted.
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Thus, by way of a bottom line on this part of 
the appeal, I conclude the trial judge erred by 
failing to find that [the accused] had been 
psychologically detained while [the officers] 
had his identification in their possession during 
the course of the CPIC and local records 
searches and during the course of their dealings 
with the NMC. Given that the police had no 
lawful authority to detain [the accused], it 
follows that this detention was arbitrary and 
hence a violation of s. 9 of the  Charter. 
[references omitted, paras. 47-48]
The Arrest
Under   ss. 137(2) or 137.1 of the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act an offender can be arrested 
for breaking  their release conditions (eg. by being 
in contact with a known criminal). Here, the trial 
judge found the accused’s arrest  was unlawful 
because, at the time he was taken into custody, no 
warrant of apprehension had yet been issued 
(s. 137(2)) by the NMC. 
Nor did s.  137.1  apply because  the arresting 
officers had not considered it as a basis 
for  arresting  the accused nor did they turn their 
minds to the question of whether the arrest was 
necessary. Rather, the officers simply effected 
the arrest on being advised that the accused was in 
breach of his release  conditions and a warrant 
would be  forthcoming. In any event, the 
circumstances of this case would not justify a 
warrantless  arrest  under  s.  137.1. The police said 
they had no concerns about the accused’s identity, 
were not concerned he was going to recommit the 
offence by associating with the driver of the vehicle 
and they  had no reason to believe he would fail to 
report if released. Since the arrest was unlawful, the 
accused’s s. 9 rights were violated. 
Search on Arrest 
Since the  accused’s arrest was unlawful, the pat-
down search of the accused’s person performed 
immediately and incidental to that unlawful arrest 
was unreasonable and breached s. 8 Charter. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETENTION GRID - R. v. Loewen, 2018 SKCA 69
CIRCUMSTANCES THE OF ENCOUNTER CONDUCT OF THE POLICE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
• The police were not providing assistance at a 
crime or accident scene nor maintaining general 
public order.
• The police did not ask the accused for identification 
for any Traffic Safety Act purpose or because he 
suspected a Criminal Code offence. 
• The officer was following his standard practice of 
asking all passengers for their identification in 
order to determine if they  might somehow  be 
caught up in the criminal justice system. 
• Under the circumstances, a reasonable person 
would feel they  were the subject of meaningful 
investigatory attention.
• The police took the accused’s photo ID and if the 
accused was to walk away  he would have to 
abandon his ID. A reasonable person would 
believe they could not simply walk away.
• The accused was not given the 
option of declining to provide 
identification. 
• This was, in substance, a 
demand by  the officer for the 
accused to hand over his 
identification. 
• The officers kept the accused’s 
identification in their possession 
for some time. It was apparent 
that police had possession of 
the accused’s identification and 
he waited in the vehicle in 
which he was a passenger for 
some considerable time – likely 
about 30 minutes – while the 
police made their inquiries.
• The accused chose not to 
testify  so the Court was 
deprived of any  knowledge of 
his personal perspectives. 
• He was on re lease in 
connection with a three-year 
sentence for the offence of 
possessing drugs for the 
purpose of trafficking. 
• There was nothing known of 
his level of education or 
sophistication.
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Search at Police Station
Since the accused’s 
arrest  was unlawful, the 
search at the police 
station associated with it 
was unlawful as well. For 
a search to be validly 
undertaken pursuant to 
the common law power to search incidental 
to arrest, the arrest  itself must be lawful. Although 
the police were in receipt of the warrant of 
apprehension from the NMC by the time the search 
was conducted at the police station, the warrant 
was invalid on its face and could therefore not have 
supported either an arrest or a search incidental to 
an  arrest. Nor could the warrant, issued after the 
fact of an unlawful  arrest,  somehow retroactively 
rehabilitate the arrest and make it lawful. 
Exclusion of Evidence                 
 
In this case, the Court of Appeal excluded the 
evidence under s. 24(2). Chief Justice Richards 
stated:
By way of overview, aspects of the police 
conduct in issue here are troubling and raise 
very real concerns. The detention and 
the arrest were both conducted in violation of 
the  Charter  and they led direct ly to 
unconstitutional searches. Further, the impact 
of the  Charter  breaches on [the accused’s] 
protected interests was significant. He was 
wholly deprived of his liberty for a time and his 
privacy interests were deeply affected. On the 
other hand, the cash and drugs are essential 
evidence in the prosecution of the offences 
with which [the accused] was charged.  
This case is arguably close to the line but, in 
my opinion, the balance ultimately tips in 
favour of excluding the evidence and hence in 
favour of reversing the decision of the trial 
judge. [paras. 90-91]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and acquittals were entered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
NO DETENTION ARISING FROM 
DNA CANVASS
R. v. Van Wissen, 2018 MBCA 110 
Following the brutal murder of a 
single mother, the police located 
male DNA on swabs taken from her 
vagina and gluteal cleft (the area 
between the buttocks). Police also 
found DNA on the bindings applied to her wrists. 
Having no suspects for the murder and anticipating 
that the DNA might identify the killer, the police 
canvassed men who knew or lived near the 
BY THE BOOK:
Corrections & Conditional Release Act
Arrest without warrant
137 (2) A peace officer who believes on 
reasonable grounds that a warrant is in 
force under this Part or under the 
authority of a provincial parole board for 
the apprehension of a person may  arrest  the person 
without warrant and remand the person in custody. 
Arrest without warrant - breach of conditions
137.1 A peace officer may arrest without warrant an 
offender who has committed a breach of a condition of 
their parole, statutory release or unescorted 
temporary absence, or whom the peace officer finds 
committing such a breach, unless the peace officer 
(a) believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest may be satisfied without arresting the person, 
having regard to all the circumstances including the 
need to 
(i) establish the identity of the person, or 
(ii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the 
breach; and 
(b) does not believe on reasonable grounds that the 
person will fail to report to their parole supervisor in 
order to be dealt with according to law if the peace 
officer does not arrest the person.
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deceased for information and DNA 
samples. The police received information 
that the accused’s father lived near the 
deceased’s home and that the accused 
had lived with him “off and on”. 
The police approached the  accused at a 
park. He was with his then girlfriend and 
her young child. Police asked him if he 
would go with them to the  police station 
to be interviewed about the death of the 
deceased. He agreed and went with the 
officers in their police car to the police 
station. He was briefly  left alone in an 
interview room that locked automatically 
from the outside. When the officers 
returned, they spoke with the accused for 
about 46 minutes. They asked him a 
range of questions including whether he 
would provide a DNA sample. He did 
not appear to be intoxicated. 
The accused agreed to provide a DNA sample. 
Before doing so, the  officers reviewed and 
completed a DNA consent form by reading the 
form to him and writing in his responses. While 
reviewing the DNA consent form with the accused, 
he expressly declined to contact counsel. The 
officers subsequently obtained a DNA sample. The 
accused’s DNA matched the DNA found on the 
deceased’s body as well as the wrist bindings. He 
was charged with first degree murder
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused contested the admissibility 
of the DNA evidence. He argued that the 
police breached his Charter rights under 
ss. 8, 9 and 10(b). In his view, the DNA 
evidence ought to have been excluded under s. 
24(2). The accused testified that the officers 
intimidated him and told him he had to accompany 
them to the police station. He said they led him to 
the police car with one officer on each side and 
then to the interview room with one officer in front 
and one behind him. He felt that he could not 
leave the interview room. He also said that the 
DNA consent form was not provided to him until 
after the police took his DNA sample and that he 
did not believe the officers ever read the DNA 
consent form to him. He testified that he  was 
intoxicated by drugs and alcohol throughout his 
dealings with police and, based on what the 
officers said to him, he did not understand that the 
DNA sample may be used in the deceased’s murder 
investigation. 
The judge found the accused’s testimony was 
inconsistent with the other evidence and was not 
credible. The judge ruled the accused had not been 
physically or psychologically  detained and 
therefore there  was no s. 9 Charter  breach. The 
judge stated, “In the circumstances presented here, 
I am not satisfied that any reasonable person in 
the accused’s position would have felt obligated to 
“The police are permitted to ask questions during an investigation even if it turns out that 
they are making inquiries with someone involved in a crime and at risk of self-
incrimination,”
DNA RESULTS
A DNA expert testified that the accused’s DNA profile 
matched the DNA found on the swabs and estimated 
the probability of selecting an unrelated individual at 
random from the Canadian Caucasian population with 
the same profile as follows: 
• Interior vaginal swab and gluteal cleft swab—1 
in 510 billion; 
• Wrist bindings, shorter end of the knot on the left 
side—1 in 
47 billion; 
• Wrist bindings, longer end of the knot on the left 
side—1 in 450 million; and 
• Wrist bindings, loose ends between the knots—1 
in 1.6 billion.  
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go with the police.” Moreover, even though the 
accused was not detained, he had been provided 
with his s. 10(b) right to counsel and there was no 
s. 10(b) Charter breach. The accused provided his 
voluntary, informed consent to give a sample of his 
DNA and therefore there was no s. 8 infringement. 
Finally, even if there were breaches of the accused’s 
Charter rights, the admission of the DNA evidence 
would not bring the  administration of justice into 
disrepute under s. 24(2). The accused was 
convicted of first degree murder.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused again submitted, 
among other things, that the 
trial judge erred in concluding 
that his rights under ss. 8, 9, or 
10(b) were not breached. 
Arbitrary Detention 
The accused asserted that he had been 
psychologically detained and the trial judge erred 
in applying an objective, as opposed to a 
subjective, test. The Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed that the trial judge erred as suggested. 
Physical Detention?
As for whether the accused was physically  detained 
or not, the Appeal Court held:
In this case, the trial judge found that the 
accused willingly attended the PSB. I am not 
persuaded that he erred in applying the legal 
principles to the facts when he made this 
finding. Even though the police car was locked, 
there was evidence that the accused was 
neither a suspect nor obligated to attend. 
Additionally, there was no evidence that the 
accused, at any time, indicated to the police 
that he wished to leave even though he was in 
a locked interview room. 
These circumstances do not, in my view, 
constitute a physical detention. [paras. 40-41]
Psychological Detention?
In applying R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32 with respect 
to psychological detention and rejecting its 
occurrence in the facts of this case, Justice 
Lemaistre for the Court of Appeal stated:
The [Supreme Court of Canada] makes it clear 
that the inquiry is an objective one in which 
“the individual’s particular circumstances and 
perceptions at the time may be relevant in 
assessing the reasonableness of any perceived 
power imbalance between the individual and 
the police”. Therefore, in my view, the trial 
judge correctly articulated the legal principles 
regarding the test for psychological detention 
and did not misdirect himself in their 
application.  [reference omitted, para. 24]
For an interaction to constitute a psychological 
detention, two requirements are needed: 
1. There must be a restrictive request or demand 
by the police to the member of the public; and 
2. Where there is no legal obligation to comply 
with that request or demand, the state conduct 
is examined in the context of the surrounding 
legal and factual situation and how that 
conduct would be perceived by a reasonable 
person in the situation as it developed. 
Here, the  accused had not been psychologically 
detained based on the nature of the contact with 
the police which involved pointed questions and 
was accusatory and confrontational. “The police 
are permitted to ask questions during an 
investigation even if it turns out that they are 
making inquiries with someone involved in a crime 
and at risk of self-incrimination,” said Justice 
Lemaistre. 
The police did not have physical contact with the 
accused, were polite to him, did not raise their 
voices to him or threaten him subtly  or otherwise. 
The police questioning was not coercive, the 
accused was sober throughout his dealings with the 
“In order to be valid, a waiver of 
section 8 rights must be both informed 
and voluntary.”
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police officers and he was well spoken and 
intelligent. As the Appeal Court noted:
The evidence established the following facts. 
The police officers were in the midst of a broad 
canvas of males associated with or living near 
the deceased. The accused was not a suspect, 
rather he was 1 of 38 individuals whom the 
police sought to interview and obtain a DNA 
sample from. Although the accused was left 
alone in a locked interview room, he was told 
he could knock if he needed anything. During 
the ensuing police interview, the questions 
were initially generic and then became more 
pointed and specific. 
In light of the trial judge’s conclusion that the 
accused was willing to attend the [police 
station], the interaction between the accused 
and the police officers was polite and friendly 
and there was no restrictive request or demand 
during the course of the interview, in my view, 
an overall view of the situation does not 
demonstrate that a reasonable person would 
have concluded that he or she was being 
deprived of his or her liberty by the state. 
Moreover, while the questioning became more 
pointed and culminated with a direct inquiry as 
to whether the accused was responsible for the 
murder and whether he would consent to 
providing samples of his DNA, focussed 
suspicion, in and of itself, does not turn the 
encounter into a detention. What is important 
is the nature of the police interaction with the 
accused based on the suspicion.
In my view, there is nothing unique about the 
accused’s personal characteristics that would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude that, in 
the circumstances, he had no choice about 
whether to comply with the police officers. 
The trial judge’s conclusions that there was no 
restrictive request or demand made by the 
police requiring the accused to accompany 
them and that a reasonable person in the 
accused’s circumstances would not conclude 
that he had been deprived of the liberty of 
choice were, in my view, correct based on the 
facts as found. [references omitted, paras. 
47-51]
Right to Counsel 
Since the accused had not been detained, he was 
not entitled to rights under s. 10(b) of the Charter. 
“Section 10(b) imposes a duty on a  police officer 
when detaining or arresting an accused to inform 
him or her that he or she has the right to counsel,” 
said Justice Lemaistre. “Where there is no 
detention, the accused is not entitled to section 
10(b) rights.” 
Unreasonable Search or Seizure 
The accused argued that he did not properly waive 
his s. 8 Charter rights because he was tricked and 
misled by the police. The Crown, on the other 
hand, contended that the accused gave his express, 
voluntary and informed consent to the taking of his 
blood sample by  the police and therefore waived 
his rights under s. 8. 
In describing s. 8 and consent, the Court of Appeal 
first stated:
Section 8 of the Charter protects against 
unreasonable search or seizure. The act of 
taking a DNA sample from the accused without 
a warrant in this case would be an 
unauthorized search or seizure absent the 
accused’s consent. The accused’s consent to 
provide a DNA sample, if valid, constitutes a 
waiver of his section 8 rights. 
In order to be valid, a waiver of section 8 rights 
must be both informed and voluntary. 
[reference omitted, paras. 59-60]
In concluding that the trial judge correctly found 
t h e a c c u s e d h a d t h e r e q u i r e d g e n e ra l 
understanding of his jeopardy and an appreciation 
“Section 8 of the Charter protects against unreasonable search or seizure. The act of 
taking a DNA sample from the accused without a warrant in this case would be an 
unauthorized search or seizure absent the accused’s consent. The accused’s consent to 
provide a DNA sample, if valid, constitutes a waiver of his section 8 rights.”
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of the consequences of deciding for or against 
exercising his s. 8 rights, Justice Lemaistre stated: 
In my view, the evidence supports the 
conclusion that the accused possessed the 
requisite informational foundation to relinquish 
his right to be free from an unreasonable 
seizure under section 8 of the Charter. He was 
told the DNA being collected would be 
compared against other DNA found at the 
crime scene. He was also told the DNA was 
being collected regarding the murder of the 
deceased and could be used as evidence in 
court. The date and location of the murder was 
on the DNA consent form. The accused was 
found to be intelligent and sober.  [para. 68]
Thus, the accused provided informed and voluntary 
consent to provide a sample of his DNA
Admissibility of the DNA Evidence 
Like the trial judge, the Court of Appeal found that 
even if their were Charter  breaches the admission 
of the DNA evidence would not have brought the 
administration of justice into disrepute. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld. 
Complete case available at www.manitobacourts.mb.ca
POLICE NEED NOT ARTICULATE 
SPECIFIC OFFENCE AT TIME OF 
ARREST
R. v S. 2018 MBCA 106                      
 
A person called 911 reporting that he 
saw a young male on a bandstand 
stage  in a public area, playing with a 
knife that had a  12-inch blade. The 
young male was cutting up hay bales 
with the knife and flipping it about.  He was not 
brandishing it or threatening anyone. The caller 
stated that there were four other people on the 
stage  but the young male  did not appear to be 
interacting with them. The caller described the 
young male’s location, appearance and clothing in 
detail, that he had a black backpack and a  bicycle 
on the stage near him and that he had seen the 
same young male take air pellet handguns out of 
the same black backpack 48 hours earlier. No guns 
were seen, however, on the day  the 911 call was 
made.
Two police officers responded to the 911 dispatch, 
which was designated as a high-priority call 
because  the incident was in progress. The officers 
arrived on scene within 10 minutes of receiving  the 
call and saw the 17-year-old accused. He matched 
the caller’s description of the young male  and was 
standing in the middle of the  stage, close to a black 
backpack and a bicycle. No knife  was in sight. An 
officer approached the accused and advised him 
the police were there because someone had called 
in to say that the accused had a large knife in his 
possession and he was seen with some firearms at 
an earlier date.  The officer then advised the 
accused that he was under arrest for “weapons-
related offences.”
The accused and the black backpack were 
searched. A folding pocket knife was located in his 
front right pant pocket and numerous knives, a 
collapsible baton, brass knuckles and two air pellet 
handguns were found in the black backpack.
ITEMS FOUND
As a consequence of the police search, the following 
items were located in the accused’s possession:
Pocket
• Folding camo-coloured knife. 
Knapsack
• 14-inch knife in a black sheath; 
• Silver-coloured brass knuckles; 
• Broken red and black folding knife; 
• Three camo-folding knives; 
• Black folding knife;
• 10-inch knife with a gut hook; 
• Collapsible baton;
• Black CO2 BB gun with a CO2 cartridge and BBs;
• Black and silver BB pistol.  
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Manitoba Provincial Court
The officer testified that he believed he 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the 
accused because he clearly matched the 
description of the male given by the 911 
caller and it was reported that he was in 
possession of a knife with a 12-inch blade.  The 
officer stated that, in his experience, unless 
displayed for decorative purposes, the  only use  of 
such a knife was as a  weapon, and that there had 
been mention of firearms being in a similar 
backpack on a previous date. He also said that the 
young male’s actions on the stage had caused the 
witness enough concern to call the police. 
The judge ruled that the accused’s rights under ss. 8 
or 9 of the Charter had not been breached when 
police searched his person and his backpack. In the 
judge’s view, the warrantless search was both 
subject ively and object ively reasonable. 
Furthermore, even if she was wrong, the judge 
would have admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The judge also concluded that the knife and other 
items in the backpack were weapons. The accused 
was convicted on two counts of carrying a 
concealed weapon and one count of unauthorized 
possession of a prohibited weapon. He was 
sentenced to 12 months probation and given a two-
year weapons prohibition. 
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused challenged his conviction 
arguing that the trial judge erred in 
finding his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were 
not breached. The appeal judge 
concluded that although the officer did not have a 
precise offence in mind when he arrested the 
accused, he didn’t need a specific offence in mind 
in order to have  a subjective belief on reasonable 
grounds that an indictable  offence had been 
committed. The officer understood that something 
not inherently  a weapon could amount to one 
depending on the circumstances. Furthermore, 
based on the fact that police had received a very 
specific and detailed complaint from an identified 
witness and were able to corroborate much of the 
witness’s information by their own observations, the 
judge held that there were objectively reasonable 
grounds to arrest. Finally, the appeal judge ruled 
that a peaceful object, or one with a dual purpose, 
could become a weapon as defined in s. 2 of the 
Criminal Code. Whether or not such an item was a 
weapon would depend on all of the circumstances.
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused made a motion to further 
appeal his conviction. He submitted that 
the appeal judge erred by concluding 
that an officer does not need to have a 
specific offence in mind in order to have a 
subjective belief on reasonable grounds that an 
indictable offence has been committed.  He argued 
that the police were required to articulate  the 
precise offence for which they were arresting the 
accused since they were only entitled to arrest 
without warrant if they reasonably believed he was 
committing, or had committed, an indictable 
offence.  Otherwise, he contended, there was no 
authority to arrest on reasonable grounds for a 
summary conviction offence. In this case, the 
officer only indicated that the accused was being 
arrested for a  “weapons-related offence”  and did 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Arrest without warrant by peace officer
s. 495(1)  A peace officer may arrest 
without warrant
(a)  a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable 
grounds, he believes has committed or is 
about to commit an indictable offence;
(b)  a person whom he finds committing a criminal 
offence; or
(c)  a person in respect of whom he has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a warrant of arrest or 
committal, in any form set out in Part XXVIII in 
relation thereto, is in force within the territorial 
jurisdiction in which the person is found.
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not specify a particular weapons offence. Since 
“weapons related offences” could include both 
dual and summary conviction only offences, an 
officer’s powers differ depending on the specific 
offence. He also asserted that the officer did not 
objectively have reasonable grounds to arrest 
without a warrant. Thus, the  evidence ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2) as a result of the 
Charter breaches. Finally, the accused argued that 
the trial judge erred in finding  that the items he 
possessed were weapons within the meaning of s. 2 
of the Criminal Code. 
Justice Steel, hearing the accused’s motion on 
behalf of the Court of Appeal, first noted that 
“when an accused challenges the validity of a 
warrantless arrest, the burden is on the Crown to 
show that the arrest was made in accordance with 
section 495(1) of the Code.” In relying on this 
provision she stated:
I agree that a police officer may arrest someone 
upon reasonable grounds only if the offence is 
an indictable offence.   He or she cannot arrest 
on reasonable grounds for a summary 
conviction offence. However, it should be 
remembered that hybrid offences found in 
the Code are deemed to be indictable offences 
by virtue of  section 34(1)  of the  Interpretation 
Act, RSC 1985, c I-21.  …
Case law interpreting this provision has 
concluded that, where an offence “may” be 
prosecuted by indictment or summary 
conviction, the Interpretation Act provision will 
apply and the offence must be deemed to be an 
indictable offence until the Crown otherwise 
elects. Thus, where an offence is a hybrid 
offence under the  Code, the offence will be 
deemed, at the time of arrest, to be an 
indictable offence and the police officer may 
arrest on reasonable grounds.  
As well, the police officer does not need to 
identify or have a specific offence in mind at 
the time they arrest a suspect (as long as the 
possible offences that are being contemplated 
by the officers are hybrid or indictable 
offences).  [references omitted, paras. 19-21]
Specific Offence Need Be Articulated?
As for the s. 29(2)(b) Criminal Code  requirement 
that a person arrested be told of the reason for their 
arrest, the substance of the reason for the arrest is 
sufficient. The exact charge, chapter and verse is 
not required. Nor does s. 10(a) of the Charter, 
which requires a person detained or arrested be 
informed promptly of the reasons therefor, require 
the police to precisely  identify the  reason for arrest 
in the words of the  Criminal Code. Justice Steel 
opined that “police officers are not required to 
articulate a specific offence at the time they arrest 
a suspect.  Rather, the authorities suggest that as 
long as the police officers articulate the substance 
of the offence that they have in mind to the 
suspect and those offences are hybrid or indictable 
offences, then the officers’ arrest of the accused, 
without a warrant but on reasonable grounds, will 
be valid.”
In this case, the police officer had a hybrid or 
indictable offence in mind when he arrested the 
accused for a “weapons related offence.”  The only 
weapons related offence under the Criminal Code 
that is purely a  summary conviction offence is 
carrying a concealed weapon while attending a 
public meeting (s. 89(1)). All other weapon-related 
offences are either strictly indictable or a hybrid 
offence (deemed indictable). “There was, in this 
case, absolutely no evidence upon which it could 
be established or inferred that the [accused] was 
attending, or about to attend, a public meeting,” 
said Justice Steel. “[The officer] testified that he 
“[P]olice officers are not required to articulate a specific offence at the time they arrest 
a suspect.  Rather, the authorities suggest that as long as the police officers articulate 
the substance of the offence that they have in mind to the suspect and those offences 
are hybrid or indictable offences, then the officers’ arrest of the accused, without a 
warrant but on reasonable grounds, will be valid.”
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told the [accused] that the police had received a 
call about him playing on the stage with a large 
knife, and he was therefore being arrested for 
weapons-related offences.  [The officer] made no 
mention of any concern or report regarding the 
[accused] attending any meeting with the knife, 
nor was he asked whether he had any such 
concerns or reports.”
Justice Steel concluded that the circumstances, 
including the place and time the accused was in 
possession of the knife, its concealment, and the 
level of credible information available  to police, 
constituted at least one, possibly more, criminal 
offences justifying an arrest for “weapons related 
offences” and the specific  offence need not be told 
to the arrestee:
Officers are not required to articulate a specific 
offence when arresting someone on reasonable 
grounds, as long as the substance of the offence 
is communicated to the accused and the 
offence contemplated by the officer falls into 
the category of a hybrid or indictable 
offence. [para. 45]
Reasonable Grounds?
Justice Steel concluded that the arresting officer 
possessed the requisite reasonable grounds to make 
the arrest. She agreed with both the  trial judge and 
the appeal judge that the specific detailed 
information provided by the 911 caller, which was 
confirmed by  the officer’s observations, provided 
both subjective and objective grounds to believe  an 
indictable offence had been committed:
[The arresting officer’s] testimony establishes 
that he subjectively believed that the 
yo[accused] in front of him was the person who 
the witness had seen playing with a 12-inch 
knife approximately 10 minutes earlier, and 
that he subjectively believed the knife to be a 
weapon, it having no other purpose on the 
streets of Winnipeg.  
There were also several pieces of evidence, 
taken together, which would lead a reasonable 
person, placed in the position of [the arresting 
officer], to conclude that there were reasonable 
grounds to arrest the [accused] for weapons-
related offences.   The witness who called 911 
identified himself (i.e., this was not an 
anonymous tip), and gave specific, detailed 
information about a young male who was 
playing with a 12-inch knife.   Based upon the 
fact that the witness made a 911 call to the 
police, it was clear that he had genuine 
concerns about this young male possessing or 
handling this large knife, despite describing 
him as “playing” with it.   Within 10  minutes, 
almost all of the information provided by the 
witness was confirmed when the officers 
arrived—a young male, exactly matching the 
description given, was standing on the stage 
where the witness said he would be, near a 
bicycle and a black backpack, as reported.  The 
only inconsistency was the absence of the 12-
inch knife in the young male’s hand.  However, 
[the arresting officer] was aware that the 
witness had reported seeing the same young 
male, two days earlier in the same location, 
take air pellet handguns out of the same black 
backpack that was currently lying one to two 
feet away from the young male.  
Given that almost everything the witness 
reported in his 911 call was observed by [the 
arresting officer] to be accurate, there would be 
no reason for [the officer] or anyone else in his 
position to disbelieve the report that a young 
male had been playing with a 12-inch knife 
approximately 10  minutes earlier, or the 
witness’s report that he had seen the same 
young male take other weapons (air pellet 
handguns) out of his black backpack a couple 
of days earlier.  Based on all of this information, 
it is my view that it was objectively reasonable 
for [the officer] to believe that the young male 
“Officers are not required to articulate a specific offence when arresting someone on 
reasonable grounds, as long as the substance of the offence is communicated to the 
accused and the offence contemplated by the officer falls into the category of a hybrid 
or indictable offence.”
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had been playing with a 12-inch knife, as 
reported, and to believe that the knife was 
probably inside the black backpack that was 
lying close to his feet. In all of the 
circumstances, [the officer] had no reason to 
d o u b t w h a t t h e w i t n e s s r e p o r t e d .  
Consequently, [the officer’s] subjective belief 
was also objectively justified.  [paras. 33-35]
Were the Knives Weapons?
Section 2 of the Criminal Code  defines a 
“weapon” as meaning “any thing used, 
designed to be used or intended for use 
(a)  in causing death or injury  to any 
person, or (b)  for the  purpose of 
threatening or intimidating any person 
…”. As to how this definition applied to a 
knife, Justice Steel stated:
 
There are thus three ways in which a 
knife may be determined to be a 
weapon: (1) the knife is actually used as 
a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury 
to a person or for the purpose of 
threatening or intimidating any person; 
(2) the knife is designed to be used as a 
weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury 
to a person or for the purpose of 
threatening or intimidating any person; 
or (3) the knife is intended to be used as 
a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury 
to a person or for the purpose of 
threatening or intimidating any person. 
[para. 38]
In this case, however, there was no evidence the 
accused actually used the knife as a weapon or that 
his knives were designed to be used as a weapon.  
“A knife is normally designed to be used for 
utilitarian, peaceful purposes and not as a weapon, 
notwithstanding the fact that it can, on occasion, 
be used effectively in fighting and notwithstanding 
that some types of knives have been recognised as 
having been ‘designed to be used’ as a weapon,” 
she said. Thus, the court needed to consider 
whether the knife was “intended for use”  (a) in 
causing death or injury to any person or (b) for the 
purpose of threatening or intimidating any person. 
In doing so, a court will determine from the 
circumstances surrounding the possession of the 
items and whether there is evidence upon which a 
judge could infer that the accused intended to use 
the knives as weapons:
The cour t s w i l l cons ide r a l l o f t he 
circumstances surrounding an accused’s 
possession of a knife when attempting to 
determine whether or not he or she intended to 
use the knife as a weapon.  Courts have relied 
upon many different circumstances to support 
the inference that the accused intended to use 
the knife as a weapon, including:
• the type of knife and its usual or designed 
purpose;
• what the accused was doing and where he 
or she was at the time he or she was seen 
or arrested;
• where the knife was located; 
• whether the accused had other weapons 
with him or her; and 
• any explanations the accused offered for 
the knife’s possession.  [para. 41]
In upholding the accused’ conviction, Justice Steel 
found the appeal judge recognized that the  trial 
judge examined all the circumstances to determine 
the accused’s intention and that the items seized 
were weapons:  
“There are ... three ways in which a knife may be determined to be a weapon: (1) the knife 
is actually used as a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury to a person or for the 
purpose of threatening or intimidating any person; (2) the knife is designed to be 
used as a weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury to a person or for the purpose of 
threatening or intimidating any person; or (3) the knife is intended to be used as a 
weapon—i.e., to cause death or injury to a person or for the purpose of threatening or 
intimidating any person.”
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In this case, the trial judge considered the 
circumstances surrounding the [accused’s] 
possession of the knives, as the law requires.  
She considered the number of knives and other 
items that could be weapons that were found 
concealed, the time of night, and the 
[accused’s] presence in a public place with 
these items. Furthermore, the following 
evidence supports the trial judge’s inference 
that the [accused] intended to use the knives as 
weapons:
• The [accused] was seen with a 12-inch 
“bowie” knife and was using it to cut up 
bales of hay on a bandstand stage, at night, 
in a public park in Winnipeg, where other 
people were present;
• The [accused] did not put the knife away 
when asked to do so by a friend;
• [The arresting officer] testified that a 12-inch 
“bowie” knife was not a hunting weapon, 
that the only use he could think of for it 
would be as a decoration on a wall, and that 
the only reason for someone to have this 
type of knife on the streets of Winnipeg 
would be to use it as a weapon;  
• There were multiple knives in the [accused’s] 
backpack, along with a prohibited weapon 
(brass knuckles), a collapsible baton, and 
two air pellet handguns with cartridges; 
• The [accused] also had a small folding knife 
concealed in his pocket; and
• The [accused] offered no explanation at the 
trial for the possession and concealment of 
these items. [para. 43]
The accused’s motion to appeal was dismissed as 
there was no arguable case of substance.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
... continued from cover.
According to the report, with a -3.1% decrease in 
BC’s violent crime rate this was the lowest violent 
crime rate since 1998.
The clearance rate, or number of offences cleared 
by police during the year as a percentage of the 
number of crimes reported to the police during that 
year, dropped by -1.7%.
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) uses weights to 
assign higher values to more serous crimes and 
lower values to less serious high volume crimes 
based on actual sentences imposed by courts. A 
jurisdiction with a higher portion of more serious 
crimes will have a higher CSI value while a 
jurisdiction with a higher proportion of less serious 
crimes will have a lower CSI value.
BC saw a +0.5% jump in its Violent CSI, primary 
driven by an increase in homicides and sexual 
assaults. BC’s 2017 Non-Violent CSI saw a -6.6% 
decrease over 2016 while  BC’s Youth CSI increased 
by +2.0% over the same time period.
 
BC CRIME RATE
Crime Rate 2016 2017 % Change
Violent 11.4 11.0 -3.1%
Property 50.0 48.1 -3.6%
Other 15.9 15.0 -6.1%
BC CLEARANCE RATE
Clearance Rate 2016 2017 % Change
Violent Crime 58.2% 57.1% -2.0%
Property Crime 13.7% 13.4% -1.8%
Other Crime 50.5% 50.2% -0.5%
CRIME SEVERITY INDEX (CSI)
CSI 2016 2017 % Change
Violent CSI 75.1 75.5 0.5%
Non-Violent CSI 100.2 93.6 -6.6%
Youth CSI 36.7 37.4 2.0%
Overall CSI 93.7 88.9 -5.1%
Source: Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General Policing 
and Security Branch. September 2018.
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January 25, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
February 8, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
March 4, 2019    Optional Workshop: Macrh 5, 2019
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
UPCOMING         
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
  December 6, 2018 
  In Person                                Click here.
April 26, 2019 
In Person or Webcast                             Click here.
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
Volume 14 Issue 6 - November/December 2014
15-006
BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF EMERGENCY & SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2018 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2018-19.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
November 8-December 13, 2018 
Report Writing for Professional Investigators (INVE-1005)
November 19-December 21, 2018 
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
January 16-February 13, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
November 19-21, 2018
Introduction to the Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
November 27-28, 2018
Introduction to Criminal Justice System (INVE-1000) 
December 3-6, 2018
Conducting Internal Investigations (INVE-1011) 
December 11, 2018
Tactical Communications (INVE-1012) 
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
November 5-9, 2018
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004)
January 14-18, 2019
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE-1004)
February 11-15, 2019
Introduction to Investigative Skills and Processes 
(INVE-1003)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate, an academic credential that can help you 
pursue or advance your in the field of investigation, 
enforcement and public safety. Many people who 
have completed the requirements for the certificate 
have gone on to a variety of rewarding careers. Apply 
online today. For more information, visit the 
Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate 
webpage.
15-007
Online Graduate  
Certificate Programs
INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
TACTICAL CRIMINAL ANALYSIS
Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certificates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
